Vulnerabilities · 48 days ago
Wiz found that 294 of 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM gateways it scanned in February accepted the setup-guide key sk-1234. LiteLLM uses that single master key as both the administrator credential and the switch that turns authentication on, so the example value opened full admin access instead of a harmless placeholder.
With that access, an operator-level user can reach every model provider API key stored on the gateway; in Wiz’s tests, the same path also reached the cloud IAM credentials of the host machine. The immediate fix is to replace the default key, but that only closes the live access path: if someone already used it, they may have left behind guardrails or SSH keys.
For teams using LiteLLM as the glue between apps, model providers, and cloud-connected workloads, the exposure sits above the app layer and below the provider accounts it brokers. A default admin secret on that bridge can turn into access to the keys and identity behind it, and rotation alone may not tell you whether anything persistent was planted.
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Nearly 1 in 10 Exposed LiteLLM Gateways Accepted the Example "sk-1234" Admin Key
Wiz found 294 of 3,074 LiteLLM gateways accepted sk-1234, exposing provider keys and enabling cloud IAM access in tests.
Part of the PlainSec briefing for 2026-09-11