The package itself is not the point here. The break is in the AUR build recipe, so a normal-looking package name and history can still launch attacker code during install and leave checksum checks looking clean. That is why this lands on developer workstations and build hosts, not just on the repository.
More than 400 AUR packages were reported hijacked after attackers adopted orphaned packages and changed their PKGBUILDs. The altered build instructions pull in a Rust credential stealer and, on root systems, can enable an eBPF rootkit; confirmed targets include browser sessions, GitHub, npm, Vault, SSH, VPN material, and other local developer secrets. The official Arch repositories were not affected.
The real risk is that any host that built or updated one of the affected AUR packages since June 11 may already have run attacker-controlled install code. Patching the package does not undo secrets, tokens, or sessions that were taken during the build.