n8n’s problem is broader than a single web bug. The platform now has flaws that let authenticated editors reach other users’ credentials and API tokens, and let unauthenticated callers push fake payloads into exposed trigger nodes as if they were trusted input.
NCSC says n8n fixed multiple issues across several branches, including XSS, SQL injection, auth bypass, prototype pollution, and data exposure in versions before 1.123.55, 2.24.0, 2.25.7, 2.26.1, and 2.26.2. The affected paths include Respond to Webhook, Chat Trigger, SecurityScorecard, Dynamic Credentials, and trigger nodes tied to MicrosoftAgent365Trigger and StripeTrigger.
The practical risk is cross-boundary compromise: one editor can expose or overwrite another user’s secrets, and a public trigger can turn malicious data into workflow execution. Partial mitigation leaves different trust breaks in place.