Dutch police confirmed they arrested a 24-year-old Amsterdam man in the ShinyHunters investigation, and the reporting now separates him from the group’s current teenage leader. The arrest advances the probe, but it does not read like a clean disruption of the crew’s present operation.
The reporting ties the case to ShinyHunters’ recent FBI job-site defacement and to Oracle PeopleSoft exploitation, but the leadership picture is already fractured: one figure is under arrest while another, younger leader is said to be driving the group. That means an arrest can change attribution without ending the campaign.
For teams watching ShinyHunters, the durable lesson is that law-enforcement action may narrow the roster without stopping the branding or the exploitation pattern. If your incident timeline depends on one named operator being the whole story, that assumption may not survive the next update.
A vulnerability in a popular line of products from Oracle is being used in a new campaign by the prolific ShinyHunters hacking group, which recently claimed credit for an attack on the FBI’s jobs site.
Dutch police have confirmed that a 24-year-old Amsterdam man arrested earlier this month was detained as part of an investigation into the ShinyHunters hacking group.
Authorities in the Netherlands have arrested a 24-year-old convicted cybercriminal on suspicion of aiding in data thefts and extortions by the prolific hacker group ShinyHunters.
Cybercrime experts are stunned as ShinyHunters risks agent safety and intense federal heat in a bizarre attempt to force the retraction of an agency advisory.
The ShinyHunters extortion gang is using a URL-encoding trick to bypass web application firewall rules that mitigate the Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 flaw, allowing the threat actors to resume widespread exploitation of a flaw on vulnerable servers.
This follow-up report details how UNC6240 (ShinyHunters) is mass-exploiting Oracle PeopleSoft (CVE-2026-35273) by bypassing WAF rules via a single URL-encoded character, providing full analysis of the attack pipeline, observed post-exploitation activity, IOCs, and remediation steps.