Malware & Tooling · Supply Chain
npm worm bypasses script checks via build metadata The break is that package screening that only looks for npm lifecycle scripts can be fooled. Miasma v2 gets code to run during install through a tiny malicious binding.gyp file, so a package can look script-free and still execute a worm.
Semgrep says the worm has now spread to 57 npm packages across 286+ malicious versions. It harvests AWS, GCP, and Azure credentials, GitHub Actions secrets, and password-store data, then persists in AI coding-assistant configs and forges provenance so reinfected packages look legitimate.
That means the trust boundary has shifted from declared scripts to build metadata. Teams that treat “no preinstall/postinstall” as a safe sign are missing an install path that still runs attacker code and keeps spreading through the package ecosystem.
3 sources · Jun 4
Timeline Sources Jun 4 Snyk Blog
Node-gyp Supply Chain Compromise | Snyk
A self-propagating npm worm uses binding.gyp and node-gyp to run code at install time, steal secrets, persist in GitHub, and spread through packages.
original Jun 4 Semgrep Blog
Miasma v2: Self-Spreading npm Worm Now Uses Malicious binding.gyp file and Compromises 57 Packages
But with a switch from install scripts to binding.gyp, this latest wave has swept up 57 packages across 286+ malicious versions.
original Jun 1 Wiz Research
Miasma: Supply Chain Attack Targeting RedHat npm Packages | Wiz Blog
Detect and mitigate malicious npm packages linked to the latest npm supply chain attack, based on the open sourced Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
original Part of the PlainSec briefing for 2026-06-04
Every edition of this story: npm worm bypasses script checks via build metadata
More from today Malware & Tooling · Supply Chain
npm worm bypasses script checks via build metadata The break is that package screening that only looks for npm lifecycle scripts can be fooled. Miasma v2 gets code to run during install through a tiny malicious binding.gyp file, so a package can look script-free and still execute a worm.
Semgrep says the worm has now spread to 57 npm packages across 286+ malicious versions. It harvests AWS, GCP, and Azure credentials, GitHub Actions secrets, and password-store data, then persists in AI coding-assistant configs and forges provenance so reinfected packages look legitimate.
That means the trust boundary has shifted from declared scripts to build metadata. Teams that treat “no preinstall/postinstall” as a safe sign are missing an install path that still runs attacker code and keeps spreading through the package ecosystem.
3 sources · Jun 4
Timeline Sources Jun 4 Snyk Blog
Node-gyp Supply Chain Compromise | Snyk
A self-propagating npm worm uses binding.gyp and node-gyp to run code at install time, steal secrets, persist in GitHub, and spread through packages.
original Jun 4 Semgrep Blog
Miasma v2: Self-Spreading npm Worm Now Uses Malicious binding.gyp file and Compromises 57 Packages
But with a switch from install scripts to binding.gyp, this latest wave has swept up 57 packages across 286+ malicious versions.
original Jun 1 Wiz Research
Miasma: Supply Chain Attack Targeting RedHat npm Packages | Wiz Blog
Detect and mitigate malicious npm packages linked to the latest npm supply chain attack, based on the open sourced Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
original Part of the PlainSec briefing for 2026-06-04
Every edition of this story: npm worm bypasses script checks via build metadata
More from today