A normal dependency install is now enough to steal secrets and spread the compromise onward. The bad assumption is that removing one package fixes the event; any host or runner that executed the release may already have leaked npm, cloud, Vault, Kubernetes, and private-key material, and those stolen tokens can be used to publish more trojanized packages.
Wiz, Socket, Snyk, and The Hacker News all tie the incident to keyv@6.0.0 and related cacheable packages, with hundreds of poisoned versions across dozens of package names. The malicious release uses an automatic preinstall hook, so npm runs attacker code before the app starts, and some copies also left Claude Code and VS Code hooks behind to keep triggering in trusted workspaces.
The wider risk is not the named package set. It is the build and developer environment, because install-time scripts and stolen publishing access let one account compromise move into downstream builds and transitive dependencies fast.